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Abstract 
Most condominiums in China are sold forward on a pre-sale market, where purchasers and 
developers transact on an underlying property that is not yet completed. During the pre-sale 
period home buyers face a significant forward contract risk. However, home buyers can borrow 
mortgages from banks so that they can effectively share the forward contract risk with banks. 
This explains the phenomenon of irregularly high early-stage default and prepayment rates 
observed in residential mortgage lending in China, where there are few, if any, financial 
incentives for mortgage borrowers to exercise either put or call options. Mortgages 
collateralized by forward housing assets are riskier than are those with underlying assets traded 
on the spot market. However, currently Chinese mortgage banks charge the same rate to all 
mortgage borrowers. This inefficiency in risk sharing between mortgage borrowers’ groups in 
the forward and spot housing markets leads to mispricing in secondary mortgage sales and 
mortgage-backed security trading. 
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Introduction 
 The residential mortgage market in China has grown rapidly since 1998, with an average 
annual growth rate of roughly 100%. By the end of the first quarter of 2005 the outstanding 
balance of residential mortgages reached 1.7 trillion RMB Yuan (Fig. 1), approximately USD 
207 billion.
1
 There are two highly distinctive features of the Chinese mortgage market: First, the 
People’s Bank of China (the central bank in China) sets the mortgage rate, which applies to all 
borrowers.
2
 Second, beyond the standard “spot” market for existing housing transactions, there is 
an active forward real estate market in the sense that the developer can sell a housing unit before 
its completion, sometimes even before construction begins. 
 A pre-sale practice that distinguishes China’s housing market from other housing markets 
is the timing of the fund allocated to developers. In many housing markets around the world, the 
funds (which typically consist of a certain percentage of the purchasing price of the property) are 
put into an escrow account and allocated to the developer gradually according to the progress 
made in building the development. In China, however, at least before 2007, funds are transferred 
to the project developer all at once. At the closing time of such a pre-sale, the purchaser can 
either pay the pre-sale price in full or finance a certain amount (usually 80% of the purchasing 
price during the period of 1998 to 2003) from a bank. As a result, during the presale
3
 period 
home buyers face a significant forward contract risk. However, since home buyers in China are 
allowed to borrow a standard mortgage from a bank to finance such a pre-sale unit, home buyers 
in the pre-sale housing market share the forward contract risk with banks. 
 This explains the phenomenon of irregularly high early-stage default and prepayment 
                                                          
1
 As of March 2007 the exchange rate of Chinese Yuan (CNY) is one U.S. dollar=7.74 CNY. 
2
 There is a long history of not using risk-based interest rates in China or other central-planning economies. It is also 
a tradition that in those countries a unified product or service is provided to all consumers. 
3
 We use the terms ‘forward market’ and ‘pre-sell market’ interchangeably. 
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rates observed in residential mortgage lending in China, where there are few if any financial 
incentives for mortgage borrowers to exercise either put or call options. A consumer (home 
buyer) in China’s forward housing market will choose to default her mortgage contract if the 
developer defaults the forward housing contract. If the forward housing unit is delivered, the 
consumer may choose to prepay the loan depending on her liquidity constraints and returns 
through alternative investment channels. Because of the embedded risk of developer default, 
mortgages collateralized on pre-sold properties are more risky than their counterparts on the spot 
market are. 
 This paper studies the competing risks of mortgage prepayment and default with 
embedded forward contract risk of developer’s default. The economic model is based upon the 
Cox proportional hazard model of mortgage termination (Cox 1972, 1975). The empirical 
analysis is based upon a rich set of mortgage-lending data from a leading mortgage lender in 
China. The loan history dataset contains not only mortgage loan characteristics, but also 
information about borrowers and developers. The unique dataset allows us to study mortgage 
borrowers’ prepayment and default behavior with embedded forward contract risks. The finding 
of this study will provide valuable insights into emerging housing and mortgage markets in 
China as well as those in other transitional economies. The remainder of the paper is organized 
as follows. Section “The Mortgage and Housing Markets in China” describes the Chinese 
mortgage market in detail, including both the single mortgage rate constraint and the forward 
market for new units. Section “The Data” describes the data used in this study. Section “The 
Empirical Model and Estimation Methodology” lays out the empirical methodology. Section 
“Empirical Results” presents a discussion of the empirical results. A brief conclusion follows. 
The Mortgage and Housing Markets in China 
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 The long history of the real estate and consumer loan markets in China was transformed 
abruptly in 1949, when China adapted the central planning system. For a long period of time, 
under the central planning regime, housing in China had been treated as a social welfare product 
administrated and delivered by state agencies (e.g., state-owned enterprises—SOEs—and 
housing bureaus) for its people. Under such a welfare-oriented system, the private housing 
market and the residential mortgage system were extinguished. The mission of Chinese banks 
was to act as government-directed funding sources for SOEs. 
 Since the early 1980s, China has gradually restructured its housing system. 
Market mechanisms, with the objectives of eliminating state housing allocations, promoting the 
privatization of public housing, and encouraging private housing development, were introduced 
in stages to replace the welfare housing system. Although China’s first modern residential 
mortgage loan was issued in 1986 by the China Construction Bank (CCB), the mortgage market 
did not play an important role in the Chinese residential housing market for another decade. By 
the end of 1997, the total outstanding mortgage balance in the People’s Republic of China was 
only approximately 19 billion RMB Yuan (USD 2.35 billion). In 1998, the People’s Bank of 
China, which functions as the central bank of China, and the State Council of China announced 
several administrative laws to speed up housing construction and intensify urban housing reform. 
The State Council announced that, among these measures, it would no longer allow SOEs to 
allocate welfare housing to their employees after December 31, 1999. At that point residential 
mortgage lending began to accelerate. By the end of 2005 the outstanding balance of residential 
mortgages exceeded two trillion RMB Yuan (USD 198 billion), almost 89 times the1997 
balance. Residential mortgages play an increasingly important role in Chinese banks’ lending 
activities. The outstanding mortgage balance constitutes more than 12% of total loans made by 
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financial institutions in the same period in 2005, compared with less than 0.4% in 1997.
 Although mortgage lending currently constitutes about 85% of total consumer lending, 
the ratio of mortgage loans to total loans was 7.5% in 2003, which is lower than it is in most 
developed countries (e.g., the ratio of mortgages to total loans is 39% in the U.S. and 59% in the 
U.K.), and even lower than in other countries in the Asia-Pacific region (Fig. 2). Therefore there 
is much room for continuing growth in China’s mortgage lending practice. 
 For details on the background of mortgage lending in China, please refer to Deng et al. 
(2005). 
 
Risk Management in Chinese Mortgage Banking 
 Lending activities in China’s residential mortgage markets are dominated by four major 
state-owned banks. They account for more than 90% of the total outstanding mortgage balance. 
Of these four banks, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and China Construction 
Bank (CCB) are the two leading mortgage lenders, representing about 70% of total outstanding 
mortgage loans. 
 Chinese banks adopted a five-category system to manage the default risks of mortgage 
portfolios in 2003. The five default-risk categories are Prime, Subprime, Irregular, Distress, and 
Default. Before approval of a loan, a bank investigates the credit worthiness of each applicant. 
The bank will approve a mortgage to an applicant according to several borrower characteristics 
such as family income, occupation, etc. Therefore there are only two pre-lending classes: Prime 
and Subprime. The bank watches the borrowers’ payment behaviors carefully and makes 
frequent adjustments to the borrowers’ risk level if it sees any warning signals. In particular, if 
the number of delinquencies is between three and six, the mortgage borrower’s risk level 
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becomes Irregular; if the number of delinquencies is above six then the borrower’s risk level 
becomes Distress. The last category in the five category risk level is Default. The headquarters 
of a mortgage lending bank also actively monitors its branches and subsidiaries. An early 
warning is given to branches with a 1%-to-3% delinquency rate in their mortgage loan portfolios; 
the headquarters requires a reorganization of mortgage operations at branches whose 
delinquency rate falls between 3% and 5%; the mortgage lending license would be revoked if a 
branch has a greater-than-5% delinquency rate. 
 
The Pre-Sell Practice in China’s Housing Market 
 Just as consumers can purchase financial instruments, they can also buy real estate either 
on the spot market or on the forward market (pre-sales). On the spot market, consumers and 
developers transact on existing housing units-housing stock; while on the forward market, 
consumers and developers agree on the price at the date of sale but the underlying property, 
which is not yet completed, is transferred to the buyer only at a certain later time, usually at the 
date of completion. Because the unit is sold well before completion and occupation, the forward 
contract is often called a presale or pre-construction transaction. 
 Mainland China adopted the pre-sale system in 1994, after the Chinese Ministry of 
Construction established “Urban Housing Pre-Sale Management Approaches.” Now a majority 
of residential housing units in urban China are transacted on the forward or pre-sale market. 
Developers usually sell condominium units well before completion, usually one to 3 years 
before,
4
 in order to hedge development risks and acquire additional funding. 
 Pre-selling exists not only in China, but it is also a popular practice in most emerging 
                                                          
4
 The pre-sale period used to be around four years, but has now decreased to one to two years. 
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Asian markets and in some developed countries. For example, Ong (1997, 1999) studied the pre-
sale market in Singapore; Chang and Ward (1993) studied the pre-sale market in Taiwan; and 
Chau et al. (2003, 2007), Yiu et al. (2005) and Wong et al. (2006) studied the Hong Kong 
market. In the United States, pre-selling of buildings and resort condominiums (in Miami and 
Hawaii, for example) has become a standard process, and virtually every condominium is 
presold today.
5
 The procedures involved in forward sales vary from market to market, and 
sometimes from developer to developer, along the following dimensions: length of pre-sale 
period, size of down-payment/deposit, payment schedule, refund policy in case of developer 
default, and eligibility for mortgage loan and mortgage rate. 
 The most important feature that distinguishes pre-sale practices in China’s housing 
market from those in other markets is the timing of the fund allocated to developers. In most 
markets, such funds (which typically consist of a certain percentage of the purchasing price of 
the pre-sale properties) are put into an escrow account and allocated to the developer gradually 
according to the progress made in building the development. In China’s housing market, 
however, at least before 2007, funds are transferred to the project developer all at once. At the 
closing time of such a pre-sale, the purchaser can either pay the pre-sale price in full or finance a 
certain amount (usually 80% of the purchasing price during the period of 1998 to 2003) from a 
bank. This special design in the pre-sale system is again due to China’s housing reform (See Yi 
and Huang 2007). Starting in the early 1990s, as the middle-income class has expanded, its pent-
up demand for housing has been unleashed; furthermore, employees could no longer obtain 
welfare housing from SOEs after December, 1999. However, the private housing supply was 
insufficient and banks were reluctant to make construction loans to new developers. Despite the 
fact that the pre-sale practice significantly lowers the entering threshold for the real estate 
                                                          
5
 A sample pre-sale contract can be found at the Miami real estate Web site, http://www.miamirealestate-trends.com     
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industry in China, thus encouraging more and more private firms to become involved in 
residential housing development, there is a major flaw in its design. The lack of legislative 
protection for buyers and the lack of properly monitoring of a developer’s use of funding gives 
some developers an opportunity to transfer the risk of development to banks and buyers. 
 
The Data 
Micro Mortgage Loan Data 
 The unique micro mortgage dataset collected by the largest residential mortgage lender in 
Beijing was first used by Deng et al. (2005). In this paper we enriched the dataset along several 
dimensions. We updated the mortgage loan data from October 2002 to the end of 2003. 
Furthermore, we extended the loan information to include property information and developer 
characteristics. This second extension is crucial because those variables enable us to merge 
borrowers’ characteristics associated with loans with the collateral information from developers 
in Beijing. The loan dataset includes 103,462 individual mortgage loans issued between 1998 
and 2003. The mortgages are 5-year, 10-year, 15-year, and 20-yearadjustable-rate loans with full 
amortization. For each loan, the available information includes the year and month of origination 
and termination (if it has been closed), indicators of prepayment or default, the original loan 
amount, the down payment rate, the initial loan-to-value ratio, maturity, the remaining term, the 
repayment method, the mortgage contract rate, the purchase price of the property, the size of the 
house, the location of the property, the sale type, the appraisal value of the property at the time of 
sale, the unit price, etc. Other borrower characteristics include the borrower’s name, education, 
gender, monthly income, occupation and position, number of dependents in the household and 
spousal income. The dataset also includes geographical information about the property and its 
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developer. This microloan data is well suited for the study of mortgage default and prepayment 
since Beijing is the capital city of China and the real estate sector is steadily increasing without a 
speculative bubble. Among the 103,462 mortgage loans, 1,384 loans were defaulted and 10,055 
loans were fully prepaid during the sampling period, and 92,023 loans were censored at the end 
of year 2003. This data is best suited for survival analysis because the data avoid the truncation 
and censoring problems. The sample started in 1998, which is the first year the bank issued 
mortgage loans. There is no left truncation problem such as most research suffers from in the 
sample selection process. The data collection cutoff date is December 31, 2003. Therefore right 
censoring is non-informative.
6
 
 Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 provide the descriptive statistics on the mortgage loans. Among 
the 103,462 residential mortgage loans that originated in Beijing, more than74% are based on 
forward contracts. Among 1,384 defaulted loans and 10,055prepaid loans, more than 90% are 
from the forward market. Borrowers’ behavior in default and prepayment vary by such loan 
characteristics as LTV and original loan amount, and by borrower’s income, occupation, and 
other household characteristics. In addition, borrowers’ behavior in default and prepayment vary 
by such developer characteristics as type, size, quality, history, etc. For example, about 45% of 
defaulted loans originated on properties built or to be built by joint developers with partners in 
Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan (HMT hereafter); while only 5% are from joint developers with 
partners in foreign countries. Among all prepaid mortgages, 47% are based on properties built or 
to be built by limited liability companies, while only 2.5% are done by joint ventures with HMT. 
Among the 103,462 mortgages, more than 63% of the loans originated on a property that is the 
                                                          
6
 An alternative sampling method, namely stratified sampling, can be used for a large dataset. To correct for possible 
sample selection bias, a weighting scheme that is assumed to be independent of error distribution can be used in the 
maximum likelihood estimation. Specifically, the weight addresses the stratified choice-based sampling of 
mortgages across loan status cells. The weight is commonly defined as the inverse of the probability that the loan is 
being selected from a cell in which it was sampled. 
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first project undertaken by its developer. Only 34% are by done by developers who have built 
more than one project in the past. Detailed descriptions can be found in Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
 
Data on Real Estate Developers in Beijing 
 Real estate development was a highly regulated industry in China before 1992. With the 
privatization of state-owned housing and the fast growth of mortgage lending, real estate 
developers in China began to flourish. There were more than four thousand active real estate 
developers in Beijing as of 2005. Before 1992 there were only 37 state-owned real estate 
developers there. We obtained a dataset covering all developers in Beijing from the Beijing 
Urban Construction Development Office (BUCD thereafter). The BUCD is a government agency 
that regulates the real estate industry in Beijing. With growing concern about information 
disclosure pertaining to developer credit quality, the BUCD began to annually review all real 
estate developers in Beijing and publish the results on its official Website in 2004. This dataset 
includes 3,088 developers and 3,938 real estate development projects in total. 
 
 Among all developers, about 87% have only one property in Beijing; only 3% of the 
developers have four or more properties. The earliest developer in our sample, an SOE, started 
its real estate business in 1966. In 1992 the total number of developers was only 90, but the 
number quadrupled by 1997 to 335. Since then, the real estate development industry has 
experienced significant growth. By the end of 2003 the total number of developers was almost 
ten times the number in 1997. 
 For each developer in the sample, we have information on credit ratings from real estate 
administration offices and commercial banks, the type of the developer, the equity value of the 
firm at registration, the location of properties and the business address of the developer, the name 
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of the CEO, the total number of employees and the detailed number of certified professionals in 
management. We also have the issuance and expiration dates of the license as well as the starting 
date in the real estate business. A drawback of this data is that we did not observe periodic 
variation prior to 2004, while the mortgage data sample ends on January 1, 2004. Therefore, 
most of the developer characteristics are static. 
 
The Empirical Model and Estimation Methodology 
An Economic Model of Mortgage Prepayment and Default with Embedded 
Forward Contract Risks 
A Simple Model for the Forward Housing Market 
 Figure 3 uses a simple timetable to illustrate the interrelationship between the home 
buyer (mortgage borrower), the developer, and the bank on the forward housing market in China. 
Following Liu (2007), we set up a three-period model in which agents make decisions only at 
discrete times such as          .     is the completion/delivery date of housing units. 
Home buyers (mortgage borrowers) can enter the housing market either at time     (on the 
spot market) or at     (on the forward market). Therefore the transaction date can be either at 
    or at    . At the transaction date, the home buyer has to pay the developer the full 
purchase price on the housing unit and the home buyer is eligible to borrower an adjustable rate 
mortgage from the bank. The mortgage loan is usually less than or equal to 80% of the housing 
value. The mortgage matures at    , but the borrower can terminate the loan at     or 
   . Between time 0 and time 1, there is a pre-sale period, in which the developer sells 
housing units forward. At     of the forward market, there is some probability of developer’s 
failure of delivery of the unit, which results in the default of the mortgage. In the case of default, 
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the bank takes the collateral residuals, which typically have very low recovery rates in China. If 
the housing unit is delivered in good quality, the home buyer (mortgage borrower) commences 
housing consumption.     is the option exercise date for a home buyer (mortgage borrower) 
who is consuming a housing service and pays monthly mortgage interest and principal. She 
would default if her housing equity is negative. She would prepay if the financing cost, i.e., the 
mortgage interest cost, exceeds the alternative investment return. The borrower may not 
optimally prepay the mortgage if she is either financially constrained due to a liquidity constraint 
or because she does not participate in stock market investment. Therefore if the home buyer 
(mortgage borrower) does not terminate the mortgage, at     she makes the last payment and 
obtains title to the house. 
 There are at least two main advantages to home buyers who lock into a pre-sale contract 
before the construction of a given property is completed. First, the housing price on the pre-sale 
market may be lower than that on the spot market (the developer is willing to cut the price for 
pre-sales, thus hedging its production risk). Second, there may be a richer menu of choices: 
location, size, view, etc. For developers, there are two benefits associated with a pre-sale 
contract. First, by locking in the selling price, the developer can hedge the project pipeline risk 
and share the risk with buyers. Uncertainty about future demand and inventory risk is 
significantly reduced. Second, the developer can access additional financing in addition to a 
construction loan, which is typically very difficult for private or new developers to procure. 
 Because of the popularity of the forward housing market and the practice involved in the 
risk-sharing mechanism adopted by home buyers (mortgage borrowers) in China, risks in the 
forward real estate market have been embedded in mortgage contract default risks, which 
complicates the valuation of the mortgage default and prepayment option in comparison with 
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those that occur in other countries. 
 
Default Option with Embedded Forward Contract Risks 
 The option theory (Black and Scholes 1973; Merton 1973) has been widely applied to 
estimate the mortgage default and prepayment probability. Early examples include Findley and 
Capozza (1977) and Buser and Hendershott (1984), among others. Recent applications include 
more sophisticated modeling techniques (see, for example, Schwartz and Torous 1989; Stanton 
1995; Deng et al. 2000). This method was however developed and first used in the developed 
mortgage market, in which spot housing contracts are predominant. It is necessary to understand 
the forward housing market and its option structures in order to apply the option theory to 
mortgage pricing where forward selling is active. With astonishing growth in the real estate 
market, many private developers have entered the residential housing market. There is increasing 
default risk among developers that fail to deliver housing. Many Chinese borrowers use a 
mortgage as a consumption insurance instrument with which to share the developer’s credit risk 
with banks. In case the borrower does not get the desired home, i.e., the developer defaults or 
fails to satisfy the home buyer on the date of delivery, the borrower will default the loan. On the 
other hand, if the borrower receives a house of expected quality, she will not default, and will 
consider prepaying according to her liquidity constraint and other investment opportunities. If a 
borrower can earn a higher return from another investment portfolio (in the stock or bond 
market), and the borrower has cash on hand, she would rather not to prepay the mortgage. 
Although in reality the consumer has to evaluate the option value of waiting, the prepayment 
option in essence reflects the trade-off between the financing cost (mortgage rate) and the 
alternative return, as well as the borrower’s liquidity constraint. 
15 
 
 
Default and Prepayment Option Analysis on the Forward Market 
 Due to the special features of pre-sales, mortgage options that originate on the forward 
market are different from those that originate on the spot market. Such mortgages face 
tremendous risks when developers fail to deliver properties on contracted delivery dates or fail to 
meet quality requirements specified in the pre-sale contracts. The two important institutional 
issues that permit such risk-sharing behavior are: (1) residential mortgages in China are non-
recourse; and (2) there was no personal credit system in mainland China during the study, and 
banks do not share mortgage borrowers’ information.7 These features are especially common in 
transitional economies or developing countries. 
 Mortgage default can occur for two reasons during the pre-sale period. First, default can 
be caused by the developer’s credit risks. These include market risk (via a channel of 
construction costs) and the idiosyncratic risk associated with the individual developers’ 
characteristics. The second default risk comes from the borrower. An individual borrower can 
experience a negative income shock or other unplanned event (e.g., a major expenditure for 
medical care). 
 After the delivery date, mortgage options for pre-sale and non-presale transactions 
become identical. After the pre-sale period, a borrower can default or prepay on a mortgage. The 
mortgage default option can be regarded as a financial put option. If the current market value of 
the house, which serves as collateral on the mortgage debt, drops below the current value of the 
remaining mortgage balance, a borrower has an incentive to default. In a boom market, the 
default option is usually out of the money. Borrowers would be better off selling the house rather 
                                                          
7
 Since 2006, the China Banking Regulatory Commission has established a series of rules for building up the 
personal credit system and regulating pre-sale practices. 
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than defaulting if they have to move. On the other hand, the prepayment option is a real option 
(call) with the strike price updating every year (depending on the bank’s ARM rate). This call 
option does not depend on the interest rate, but is closely related to the borrower’s alternative 
investment opportunity set. One can think of mortgage debt as a consumption-smoothing 
instrument. In the current Chinese capital market, there are very few investment opportunities 
and very few borrowing vehicles. In mainland China the stock market is the major investment 
vehicle for Chinese citizens. Borrowers will therefore make prepayment decisions based on the 
cost of capital and stock market returns. They will prepay when the cost of capital (the mortgage 
rate), exceeds the investment return. Figures 4 and 5 show the mortgage rate dynamics and stock 
index return in China during the period of 1998–2005. 
 
The Competing Risks Hazard Model of Prepayment and Default 
 Default and prepayment are options of borrowers embedded in any mortgage loan. 
Recent research on mortgage markets indicates that the behaviors involved in exercising those 
two options are distinct but not independent. For example, in exercising the default option the 
borrower gives up the option to prepay the loan in the future. We apply the Cox proportional 
hazard model (PHM) to assess the competing risks of mortgage termination by simultaneously 
modeling the prepayment risk and the default risk. 
 Since the early work of Dunn and McConnell (1981) and Green and Shoven (1986), 
researchers have modeled mortgage contracts in a contingent claims framework. The borrower’s 
option to prepay a mortgage is an embedded call option at a strike price of par, while the default 
option is a put option at a strike price equal to the market value of the collateral property. The 
prepayment option gives a mortgage borrower the right to repay the mortgage balance when its 
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market value equals or exceeds par, i.e., when the market rate drops below the mortgage coupon 
rate. Exercise of the call option results from two primary motivations: (1) to refinance the 
existing debt at a lower rate of interest; or (2) to terminate the debt through the sale of the 
underlying asset—the house—due, for example, to relocation. Analogously to prepayment, 
mortgage default is a put option. If the current market value of a house, which serves as 
collateral for the mortgage debt, drops below the current value of the remaining mortgage 
balance, a borrower has an incentive to default. Therefore the default option gives the borrower 
the right to sell the house to the lender at a price equal to the value of the mortgage. In the 
absence of transaction costs, a rational borrower can maximize her welfare by exercising such 
options when they are in the money. 
 As discussed in the section above, the special features of China’s mortgage contracts 
have to be taken into account when calculating the option values. In particular, the collateral for 
a pre-sale house has to be carefully modeled for the default option, while the prepayment option 
is different in an economy where there is essentially no interest risk. The prepayment option is at 
work, even though there is no interest risk, because mortgage borrowers then will decide when to 
exercise the option based on the trade-off between the borrowers’ financing cost and alternative 
investment returns. 
 Furthermore, these two options compete against each other. Kau et al. (1992), Kau and 
Keenan (1995) have discussed the theoretical relationships among the options. Schwartz and 
Torous (1993) is among the first studies to demonstrate the empirical importance of such 
options. 
 The desired model outputs are explanatory variables affecting the conditional 
probabilities of mortgage default or prepayment. The PHM model estimates the effects of these 
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variables on the time to default. In particular, we estimate the probability that a mortgage with 
certain characteristics will be terminated in a given period where there has been no default or 
prepayment experience up until that period. 
 Following Deng et al. (2000), this paper simultaneously estimates the default risk and 
prepayment risk in the presence of forward markets. The joint survival function is given in the 
following form: 
                                                                
         
  
        
  
                                                                                                             
where 
                  
                   
       
                  
                   
       
 The log-integrated hazard function can be also written in the following form as: 
           
                                                                  
 In this formulation, S is a cumulative survival probability conditional on housing price H, 
alternative investment return R, vector of macro-economic variables Z, and vector of micro 
variables               Both Z and g are time-varying, where Z measures the systematic risk 
of the market and loan-level information while g measures the intrinsic values of the default and 
prepayment options. Among g,    represents borrower characteristics and    stands for 
collateral information.    is a dummy variable equal to unity if the loan is to finance a forward 
house, and zero otherwise.   ,    are discrete random variables representing the loan life of a 
mortgage prior to default and prepayment, respectively.    ,    , and   are hazard functions; 
unobserved error terms associated with the hazard functions for default and prepayment are 
denoted by    and   , respectively, to represent heterogeneities. The Kaplan–Meier approach 
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was used to fit the empirical hazard rates of prepayment and default based on the entire sample. 
 Equation 2 assumes, however, that the market effects of Z are the same for both forward 
mortgages and spot market mortgages. It also assumes that the error structures are the same for 
all mortgage loans. To accommodate this restriction, a more complete separation regression for 
the forward market and for the spot market can be estimated similar to Blinder (1973) and 
Oaxaca (1973). 
 For the spot market without pre-sale, 
   
         
   
                    
      
    
                                                   
 For the forward market with pre-sale,  
   
         
   
                    
      
    
                                                   
where   
      
              
 
 is a column vector of repressors,    ,   and         
       
     , and          
      are regression coefficients. 
 The log Hazard Ratio, denoted by     between two groups of F and S, can be 
decomposed into two parts: 
       
 
   
 
    
 
  
 
   
 
                                                                        
where the upper bar associated with a variable indicates the mean and estimated coefficients. The 
first part of the risk differential is due to differences in the typical loan characteristics of forward 
versus spot   
 
  
 
 , assuming they are valued at the same spot market. The second part of the 
risk differential reflects the portion of the higher risk on forward market loans that arises because 
they are priced differently from otherwise identical mortgages for existing house financing. 
 The default options in the pre-sale period versus the post-sale period are entirely 
different. In the post-sale period, the default option is related intensively to the housing price. 
20 
 
However, in the pre-sale period, the default option depends mainly on the probability of 
developer default. Following Deng et al. (2000), the proxy value of exercising the “put option” 
for a mortgage borrower in the post-sale period is measured by the probability of negative 
equity.
8
 In particular, the variable “put_proxy” is defined as: 
            
           
 
                                                                                                   
Where 
    
    
         
   
   
                                                                                                                          
     
    
  
                                                                                                                                     
    is the market value of mortgage debt;  is the monthly payment of mortgage principle 
and interest,      is the adjustable mortgage rate for a loan originated at time   and after the 
seasoning period of  .   is the mortgage term.    is the market value of a house that is 
purchased at   with price P and valued at      ;    is the housing price index at time τ in the 
area. The term in parentheses of Eq. 8 follows a log normal distribution.      is the cumulative 
standard normal distribution function, and   is housing index volatility.9 The calculation of    
involves calculating an annual re-setting of the monthly payment of principle and interest. 
 The intrinsic value of the call option is defined as: 
           
     
  
                                                                                                                        
where   , as defined previously, is the market value of a mortgage, the cost of financing a house 
                                                          
8
 Typically one cannot estimate directly which default option is in the money without knowing the entire path of 
individual house values. However, we can use the initial loan-to-value ratio and the diffusion process of house prices 
to estimate the critical value for a borrower to exercise the put option, known as the probability of negative equity. 
9
 The housing price indices and their volatilities are estimated according to the three-stage procedure originally 
created by Case and Shiller (1989) and modified by Quigley and Van Order (1995). 
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purchase, and    is the value of hypothetical income, the return from an alternative investment. 
 Since the stock market is a major investment alternative, the Shanghai stock price index 
is used in return calculation. Specifically,    is defined as: 
    
            
 
       
   
   
                                                                                                             
 In addition to the intrinsic value of options, three sets of non-option-related variables are 
included in the regression. Those variables include time-varying and time-invariant determinants 
of mortgage performance motivated by our economic model. The first set of variables, denoted 
by   , describe the borrowers’ characteristics including gender, age, education, the log value of 
monthly income from borrowers and their spouses, occupation, marital status, number of 
dependents in the borrower’s household, etc. The second set of variables, denoted by   , 
describes collateral information. The developer-related information includes credit ratings, type 
of developer, the age of the developer, the equity value of the firm at registration, the size of the 
developer, the ratio of certified professionals to total employees, and the number of projects, etc. 
Other loan-related information includes the original loan amount, the down payment rate, the 
loan-to-value ratio at origination, the year and month, maturity, the size of the house, the location 
of the property, the sale type, the appraisal value of the property at time of sale, etc. 
 
Empirical Results 
 The risk analyses are based on the full sample from the combined dataset including bank 
loans and the real estate developer database. The competing risks of default and prepayment are 
estimated jointly. Table 6 presents three variations of the competing risks model of loan 
termination. All specifications incorporate both market variables and a rich set of loan 
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characteristics including borrowers’ characteristics and collateral information. The market 
variables include time-varying proxies for local economic conditions such as inflation, the 
unemployment rate, the slope of the term structure of interest rates, stock market returns, etc. 
Each of the three models contains separate flexible baseline functions for default and prepayment 
that follow Han and Hausman (1990). The empirical results are different from an earlier 
assessment of loan performances in China conducted by Deng et al. (2005). Their paper includes 
only loan performance data; therefore it cannot distinguish pre-sale contracts from contracts on 
completed property. An important data extension in this paper is that we are able to link each 
loan to the underlying housing unit and its builder. Therefore, impacts of borrower or developer 
characteristics on the default (prepayment) probability are conditional on the same contract type 
(spot or forward). This is in contrast to Deng et al. (2005), who estimate the pooled impact of 
borrowers on the probability of loan termination. 
 Model 1 tests both the default rate and the prepayment rate equations following 
Eq. 2, where the presale dummy is estimated in a hazard regression framework and the 
interaction term    is constrained as zero. Furthermore, the model does not control directly for 
the intrinsic value of call and put options in the estimation. Model 1 provides a benchmark for 
the competing risks specifications discussed below. Model 2 extends model 1 by including the 
contemporaneous values of options in both the default and prepayment equations. Model 3 
further extends model 2 by including interaction terms of pre-sale with a call option and a put 
option in both risk equations. Overall, the competing risks models are well-specified and control 
for approximately 40 factors, including market condition and borrower-developer characteristics. 
 As evidenced in model 1, estimation results indicate that economic conditions in the 
market have important impacts on default and prepayment behaviors. As a proxy for the overall 
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economy, the Shanghai Stock Index is negatively associated with default and prepayment. An 
increase in local unemployment rates positively affects the exercise of the default option and the 
prepayment option. This result is highly significant across model specifications. The 
unemployment rate is a macro variable indicating the strength of the macroeconomic 
environment. It also reflects Chinese borrowers’ confidence about job stability and financial 
soundness. For most Chinese households, housing is a basic form of consumption. When facing 
uncertainty about future wealth, they will choose to invest in housing rather than in risky stocks 
and bonds. This is quite different from the situation in the US, where prepayment risk is 
negatively associated with the unemployment rate. The slope of the term structure of the interest 
rate, defined as the difference between the 5-year CD rate and the spot rate, discloses 
expectations about future interest rates. When the yield curve widens, borrowers in China may 
prefer to prepay mortgage debt. As shown in model 1, while the relationship between default 
behavior and the slope of the term structure is statistically insignificant, the prepayment rate is 
negatively associated with the slope of the term structure and statistically significant. 
 The estimates from model 1 suggest that the loan-to-value ratio at origination is 
positively associated with the default risk and negatively associated with the prepayment risk. 
Higher LTV reflects greater liquidity constraint on the part of the purchaser, which means she 
has less equity invested in the house. Model 1 also shows that the likelihood of default and 
prepayment, respectively, vary positively with housing-expense burdens proxied by the 
mortgage-expense-to income ratio. 
 Model 1 also estimates the effects of borrowers’ characteristics, including borrower’s 
age, sex, marital status, education background, occupation and job positions, log monthly 
household income, and number of dependents in the household. Among these categorical or 
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continuous variables, household income is an important factor in determining default and 
prepayment risk. High-income borrowers are less likely to default and more likely to prepay. The 
log income is highly significant across all three models. Another continuous covariate that is 
statistically significant is the number of dependents in a household. The more dependents there 
are in a household, the higher is the burden of the mortgage borrower and thus the higher is the 
default probability and the lower is the prepayment risk. Among the categorical covariates, sex is 
insignificant; age is, however, significant across these three models. Older borrowers have 
relatively lower default risk and higher prepayment risk. Younger people in China are more 
liquidity constrained and also prefer to smooth consumption by borrowing, reflecting a 
difference in lifestyle preference in China. Marital status is another significant factor in 
determining the default and prepayment rates. Married borrowers have both a lower default rate 
and a prepayment rate reflecting that a family is a more stable and responsible social unit than a 
single person. Occupations and job positions are significantly associated with prepayment risk. 
The business and trade industry shows a higher prepayment risk due to relatively volatile income 
streams, while the research and education sector has a lower risk of prepayment because of its 
relatively stable income streams. Managers exhibit a relatively higher prepayment risk than 
technicians and self-employed persons. On the other hand, none of them is statistically 
significantly associated with defaults. A borrower with a college degree has a lower default risk 
but a higher prepayment risk. 
 In addition to borrowers’ characteristics, model 1 also finds a significant impact of 
collateral information on mortgage termination in China. In particular, mortgages on underlying 
properties built by bigger or older developers exhibit lower default risk. There are two measures 
of developer size—one is the currency-adjusted value of registered equity and the other is the 
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total number of employees in a firm. These two size variables are statistically significantly 
associated with default risk, while the association with prepayment risks is insignificant. New 
developers tend to be associated with a higher default risk and a higher prepayment risk with 
respect to mortgage loans. In the study sample period, the Chinese housing sector was 
experiencing tremendous development, which stimulates more companies to enter into the real 
estate business. While it is hard for consumers to monitor and judge the quality of properties they 
are developing, established developers have an operational advantage in this market. Developer 
quality not only affects the property price, but it also impacts the financial market via the channel 
of mortgage termination. Developers who are involved in residential real estate development for 
more than 20 years are associated with lower default risk and higher prepayment risk. The ratio 
of certified professionals to total developer employees is also significantly associated with 
mortgage default and prepayment rates. The higher the professional ratio, the lower the default 
risk and the higher the prepayment risk. A strong developer tends to have more certified 
professionals and to have passed a higher industry standard (for example ISO 9000) and also to 
prefer undertaking long-term commitments. Since a developer of good quality tends to exercise 
better cost management, quality control, and reputation management, its pre-sale houses will 
show a lower probability of failure of delivery. Therefore mortgages associated with good-
quality developers will exhibit lower default risk and higher prepayment rates. Developer type is 
also associated with different default and prepayment risks. A foreign joint venture developer 
exhibits lower default risk and higher prepayment risk, while joint ventures with HMT 
developers are associated with higher default risk. Compared with state-owned developers, 
private developers and limited liability companies have both higher default risk and higher 
prepayment risks. The location of a property is also associated with different default and 
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prepayment risks. In a central city area, due to competition and tighter regulation or monitoring, 
mortgages with underlying property in a central city area tend to have lower default risk and 
higher prepayment risk. 
 Model 2 extends model 1 through the introduction of the option-related time varying 
covariates into both the default and prepayment equations.
10
 The estimates confirm that the put 
option, measured as the probability of negative equity, is positive and highly significant in the 
exercise of the default option; the call option value is also positively and highly significant in the 
exercise of the prepayment option. In other words, with an increase in the probability of negative 
equity the incidence of default increases dramatically. On the other hand, declines in returns 
from alternative investments that bring the call option in the money will lead to a high rate of 
prepayment activities. The stock market in China is a fast-growing investment vehicle that offers 
returns beyond those of traditional deposits. Investment in the stock market has been showing 
greater and greater importance in Chinese people’s financial decisions. The intrinsic value of the 
prepayment option in essence reflects a consumer’s portfolio choices. Model 2 further indicates 
that the value of a call option is negatively associated with default risk. In a bull stock market, 
households may relocate their assets from housing to the stock market by stopping mortgage 
payments. 
 Model 3 further includes the interaction term between pre-sale and option values to test 
whether the intrinsic value of options on the forward market exerts more influence there than on 
the spot market. The default behavior is less sensitive to the put and call options for mortgage 
loans with pre-sale properties. For prepayment behavior, the call option and put option are less 
sensitive to pre-sale mortgage loan borrowers. This means that pre-sale is apparently an 
                                                          
10
 Log Likelihood and the Schwarz-Bayesian Criterion (SBC), reported at the bottom of the table, provide for a 
comparison of the goodness of fit among alternative models. Models with lower values are considered preferable. 
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important factor that is highly correlated with both default risk and prepayment risk. If a loan is 
associated with a forward housing purchase, it is such bad news for the default and prepayment 
risks that option values (of both call and put) do not add as much to risks as they do in a spot 
market. The significance in the product terms indicate that the default risk and prepayment risks 
influence behavior quite differently on the forward market for presale houses and on the spot 
market. 
 In similar fashion, product terms between pre-sale and other borrower characteristics and 
collateral information can be tested. Since mortgages on pre-sale houses exhibit strikingly 
different default and prepayment behaviors, a more complete separation of hazard regressions is 
performed towards the forward market and spot market, respectively. Table 7 displays the 
regression results for the two markets. On the forward market, while the intrinsic value of the 
call option is significant for exercises of the default option and the prepayment option, the 
probability of negative equity is associated with neither the default option nor the prepayment 
option in a statistical sense. The value of the mortgage default option exhibits an entirely 
different underlying effect among pre-sale houses when compared with its effect on completed 
projects. On the forward market, the housing price index has little to do with default risk, since 
the collateral for pre-sale houses is on paper. Therefore the probability of negative equity is more 
closely associated with houses on the spot market, while houses on the forward market depend 
more on the probability of house delivery. Another remarkable feature of the separate regressions 
is that borrowers’ characteristics and developer information play different roles on the spot 
market and the forward market. Borrower characteristics (age, marital status, education, 
occupation and job position) are only statistically significant on the spot market, while they are 
not significant on the forward market. 
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 The empirical results reported in Table 7 show that many borrower’s characteristics are 
statistically significant in determining default risks on the spot market. For example, younger 
borrowers, singles, the elementary school education group, and the social service as well as the 
self-employment group are associated with higher default risks, while older borrowers, singles, 
the college education group, and managers are associated with higher prepayment risks. None of 
these borrower characteristics is, however, statistically associated with mortgage termination 
risks on the forward market. 
 On the other hand, developer characteristics (number of projects taken, size, age, and 
organization structure of the developer) are statistically significant in association with mortgage 
termination only for pre-sale loans; none of these characteristics is significant on the spot market. 
For example, developers that have completed more projects in the past and are bigger and more 
experienced, show a higher ratio of certified professionals to total employees, or are involved in 
foreign joint ventures associated with lower default risks and higher prepayment risks. None of 
these developer characteristics is statistically significant in the spot market regression. 
 Our data shows that among 1,384 default incidences, 84% of the loans are clustered 
according to projects that involved developer defaults. In addition, all loans associated with 
development project defaults are defaulted by homer buyers (mortgage borrowers). To capture 
the potential cluster effect of developer default, we create a developer concentration index (DCI), 
such that,           , where   is defined as the ratio of the number of developers involved 
to the number of loans defaulted or prepaid.
11
 On a forward market, the DCI is both 
economically and statistically significant for defaulted loans, indicating that most defaulted loans 
                                                          
11
 The construction of a DCI index is similar to that of a Herfindahl index. The higher the index, the more 
concentrated the defaulted loans are to developers. 
29 
 
issued for pre-sale buyers are concentrated in only a few defaulted developers.
12
 
 Finally, although the sensitivities are different, some loan characteristics, the location 
variable, and market condition share the same sign across the spot market and forward market. 
For instance, on both markets, the more dependents there are in a household the higher is the 
default risk, and the lower is the prepayment risk due to households’ liquidity constraints. A 
central city location enjoys lower default risks and higher prepayment risks.  
 To demonstrate the mortgage prepayment and default risks with and without embedded 
forward contract risks, we simulate 300 paths of house price appreciation rates and stock returns 
according to a joint stochastic mean-reverting process. These 300 randomly sampled paths are 
applied to the prepayment and default functions reported by model 4 in Table 7 to compute the 
monthly prepayment and default risks associated with the hypothetical 0.5 million RMB 
mortgages. We compare two hypothetical mortgage pools characterized by two risk structures 
between spot and forward market mortgage borrowers. The present values of the cash flows from 
the two groups allow us to calculate the risk premium on the forward presale housing market 
(This is similar to Deng and Gabriel 2006). Table 8 reports a simulated result on a forward risk 
premium that is about 250 basis points per year. This premium is based on market conditions 
during the period of 1998 to 2003 in Beijing. If stock market returns, the interest rate, or the 
unemployment rate changes, the premium will certainly be different. However, mortgage 
performance in our sample shows that the risk premium between the forward and spot markets is 
both economically large and statistically significant. 
  
                                                          
12
 It is worthy of mention that a DCI—a measure of developer’s local market share—is only one way of proxying 
the developer’s default risk. Other omitted factors, such as developer’s default history, local market environment, 
etc., might also trigger developer default. We thank the editor for pointing this limitation out. 
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Conclusion 
 This paper is the first to provide rigorous analysis of mortgage risks on the forward pre-
sale housing market. The findings indicate that borrower characteristics and collateral 
information are both important to determine the mortgage termination risks. Currently most 
Chinese banks price consumer loans based on borrower characteristics only. The results of this 
paper indicate a potential improvement in banks’ mortgage risk modeling. In addition, mortgage 
borrowers’ prepayment and default behavior in the forward housing market is significantly 
different from that of the spot housing market. The study finds that the potential difference in 
risk premium between the forward and spot housing markets in China can be as high as 250 basis 
points. The findings of this study will provide valuable insights regarding emerging housing and 
mortgage markets in China as well as those in other transitional economies. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for mortgage loans frequency of loans by loan category and by 
payoff types (I) 
Variable Defaulted Prepaid Other All loans 
Origination year 
   1998 
   1999 
   2000 
   2001 
   2002 
   2003 
   Total 
 
29 (9.27) 
10 (0.23) 
392 (2.03) 
372 (1.46) 
529 (2.18) 
52 (0.18) 
1,384 (1.34) 
 
84 (26.84) 
905 (20.45) 
3,117 (16.16) 
3,165 (12.41) 
1,644 (6.76) 
1,140 (3.85) 
10,055 (9.72) 
 
200 (63.90) 
3,511 (79.33) 
15,778 (81.81) 
21,972 (86.13) 
22,132 (91.06) 
28,430 (95.98) 
92,023 (88.94) 
 
313 (0.30) 
4,426 (4.28) 
19,287 (18.64) 
25,509 (24.66) 
24,305 (23.49) 
29,622 (28.63) 
103,462 (100.00) 
Loan to value ratio 
   LTV < 60 
   60 ≤ LTV <    
   LTV ≥    
 
309 (1.33) 
281 (1.12) 
794 (1.44) 
 
2,608 (11.27) 
2,538 (10.12) 
4,909 (8.89) 
 
20,232 (87.40) 
22,252 (88.76) 
49,539 (89.68) 
 
23,149 (22.37) 
25,071 (24.23) 
55,242 (53.39) 
Original loan amount (OLA) 
   OLA < 200,000 RMB 
   200,000 ≤ RMB OLA < 400,0000 RMB 
   OLA ≥ 400,000 RMB 
 
508 (1.40) 
430 (1.37) 
446 (1.26) 
 
3,732 (10.32) 
2,960 (9.46) 
3,363 (7.84) 
 
31,938 (88.28) 
27,892 (89.16) 
32,193 (84.12) 
 
36,178 (34.97) 
31,282 (30.24) 
36,002 (31.53) 
Market of transaction 
   Spot market 
   Forward market 
 
141 (0.53) 
1,385 (1.81) 
 
628 (2.34) 
9,427 (12.30) 
 
26,076 (97.14) 
65,805 (85.89) 
 
26,845 (25.95) 
76,617 (74.05) 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for mortgage loans frequency of loans by collateral/developer 
category and by payoff types (II) 
Variable Defaulted Prepaid Other All loans 
Rating Group 
   1 
   2 
   3 
   4 
   Unrated 
 
8 (0.01) 
1 (0.01) 
1 (0.02) 
742 (53.57) 
620 (1.02) 
 
543 (0.63) 
1,159 (7.96) 
500 (10.51) 
65 (4.69) 
4,740 (7.79) 
 
3,536 (4.13) 
13,404 (92.04) 
4,255 (89.47) 
578 (41.73) 
55,479 (91.19) 
 
4,087 (4.77) 
14,564 (17.01) 
4,756 (5.55) 
1,385 (1.62) 
60,839 (71.05) 
Developer Type 
   SOE 
   JV_HTM 
   JV_F 
   Limited 
   Private 
 
123 (0.89) 
621 (19.88) 
68 (1.46) 
380 (0.64) 
192 (3.95) 
 
1,310 (9.43) 
258 (8.26) 
404 (8.69) 
4,675 (7.91) 
359 (7.38) 
 
12,462 (89.69) 
2,245 (71.86) 
4,175 (89.84) 
54,084 (91.45) 
4,311 (88.67) 
 
13,895 (16.22) 
3,124 (3.65) 
4,647 (5.42) 
59,139 (69.03) 
4,862 (5.68) 
History of Developer 
   <5 years old 
   ≥5 years old 
 
4 (0.01) 
1,334 (2.33) 
 
2,700 (9.89) 
4,132 (7.23) 
 
24,598 (90.10) 
51,672 (90.43) 
 
27,302 (32.33) 
57,138 (67.67) 
Currency type of equity 
   USD 
   RMB 
 
687 (0.87) 
1,384 (1.62) 
 
6,447 (8.18) 
7,006 (8.18) 
 
71,700 (90.95) 
77,277 (90.21) 
 
6,833 (7.98) 
78,834 (92.02) 
Valid period of license 
   Short 
   Long 
 
1,034 (5.46) 
321 (0.54) 
 
1,582 (8.35) 
4,579 (7.76) 
 
16,325 (86.19) 
54,115 (91.70) 
 
18,941 (24.30) 
59,015 (75.70) 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for mortgage loans frequency of loans by collateral/developer 
category and by payoff types (III) 
Variable Defaulted Prepaid Other All loans 
Location 
   Outer city 
   Inner city 
 
244 (2.04) 
1,140 (1.25) 
 
1,702 (14.20) 
8,353 (9.13) 
 
10,044 (83.77) 
81,979 (89.62) 
 
11,990 (11.59) 
91,472 (88.41) 
Quality control standard 
   None 
   Pass 
 
1,375 (1.40) 
9 (0.17) 
 
9,445 (9.61) 
610 (11.83) 
 
87,484 (88.99) 
4,539 (88.00) 
 
98,304 (95.01) 
5,158 (4.99) 
Positive review by real estate 
   None 
   Good 
 
1,376 (1.33) 
8 (0.01) 
 
9,252 (8.94) 
803 (0.78) 
 
84,888 (82.05) 
7,135 (6.90) 
 
95,516 (92.32) 
7,946 (7.68) 
Developer and project location 
   Different district 
   Same district 
   One or two missing 
 
1,246 (1.68) 
18 (0.06) 
120 (0.12) 
 
7,752 (10.45) 
2,178 (7.75) 
79 (0.08) 
 
65,214 (87.88) 
25,915 (92.19) 
701 (0.68) 
 
74,212 (72.53) 
28,111 (27.47) 
900 (0.87) 
Internal monitoring 
   Strong 
   Weak 
 
778 (1.62) 
606 (1.61) 
 
3,633 (7.57) 
3,379 (8.96) 
 
43,576 (90.81) 
33,726 (89.43) 
 
47,987 (56.00) 
37,711 (44.00) 
Quality control standard 
   None 
   Pass 
 
1,375 (1.40) 
9 (0.17) 
 
9,445 (9.61) 
610 (11.83) 
 
87,484 (88.99) 
4,539 (88.00) 
 
98,304 (95.01) 
5,158 (4.99) 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for mortgage loans frequency of loans by category and by payoff 
types (IV) 
Variable Defaulted Prepaid Other All loans 
Positive review 
   None 
   Good 
 
1,376 (1.33) 
8 (0.01) 
 
9,252 (8.94) 
803 (0.78) 
 
84,888 (82.05) 
7,135 (6.90) 
 
95,516 (92.32) 
7,946 (7.68) 
Professional ratio 
   Low  
   High 
 
757 (3.86) 
616 (0.93) 
 
1,690 (8.61) 
5,306 (8.05) 
 
17,177 (87.53) 
59,998 (91.02) 
 
19,624 (22.94) 
65,920 (77.06) 
Developer size 
   Number of employee < 30 
   Number of employee ≥ 30 
 
1,318 (3.07) 
55 (0.13) 
 
3,333 (7.76) 
3,665 (8.60) 
 
38,314 (89.17) 
38,875 (91.27) 
 
42,965 (50.22) 
42,595 (49.78) 
Registered equity 
   Equity < 30 million RMB 
   Equity ≥ 30 million RMB 
 
1,268 (3.46) 
57 (0.12) 
 
2,872 (7.84) 
4140 (8.45) 
 
32,497 (88.70) 
44,805 (91.44) 
 
36,637 (42.78) 
49,002 (57.22) 
Number of projects 
   Single property 
   Multiple properties 
 
1,373 (2.10) 
11 (0.03) 
 
6,592 (10.07) 
3,417 (9.05) 
 
57,495 (87.83) 
34,335 (90.92) 
 
65,460 (63.42) 
37,763 (36.58) 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for mortgage loans frequency of loans by borrower category and 
by payoff types 
Variable Defaulted Prepaid Other All loans 
Marital status 
   Married 
   Single 
 
562 (1.21) 
822 (1.44) 
 
4,277 (9.24) 
5,778 (10.10) 
 
41,440 (89.54) 
50,583 (88.46) 
 
46,279 (44.73) 
57,183 (55.27) 
Education 
   College 
   Secondary school 
   Primary school 
 
843 (1.30) 
482 (1.38) 
59 (1.60) 
 
6,432 (9.92) 
3,254 (9.32) 
369 (9.99) 
 
57,563 (88.78) 
31,195 (89.30) 
3,265 (88.41) 
 
64,838 (62.67) 
34,931 (33.76) 
3,693 (3.57) 
Age cohort 
  Age <40 
  Age ≥40 
 
1,036 (1.29) 
348 (1.49) 
 
6,574 (8.21) 
3,481 (14.86) 
 
72,420 (90.49) 
19,603 (83.66) 
 
80,030 (77.35) 
23,432 (22.65) 
Income groups (monthly) 
   <8,888 RMB 
   ≥8,888 RMB 
 
1,006 (1.31) 
378 (1.43) 
 
6,623 (8.60) 
3,432 (12.99) 
 
69,403 (90.10) 
22,620 (85.58) 
 
77,032 (74.45) 
26,430 (25.55) 
Occupation 
   Business/trade 
   Social service 
   Self-employment 
   R&D 
   Others 
 
248 (1.11) 
130 (1.33) 
602 (1.42) 
80 (0.81) 
324 (1.69) 
 
1,854 (8.27) 
849 (8.72) 
4,960 (11.72) 
773 (7.82) 
1,619 (8.47) 
 
20,303 (90.62) 
8,759 (89.95) 
36,746 (86.85) 
9,038 (91.38) 
17,177 (89.84) 
 
22,405 (21.66) 
9,738 (9.41) 
42,308 (40.89) 
9,891 (9.56) 
19,120 (18.48) 
Job position 
   Manager 
   Others 
   Technician 
   Clerk 
 
768 (1.22) 
214 (10.77) 
168 (1.21) 
234 (1.14) 
 
6,184 (9.86) 
607 (16.76) 
1,256 (9.03) 
2,008 (9.77) 
 
55,766 (88.92) 
5,457 (172.48) 
12,482 (89.76) 
18,318 (89.10) 
 
62,718 (60.62) 
6,278 (6.07) 
13,906 (13.44) 
20,560 (19.87) 
 
  
41 
 
Table 6. Maximum likelihood estimates for competing risks of Chinese adjustable rate mortgage 
prepayment and default 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Default Prepay Default Prepay Default Prepay 
Fraction of contract 
value 
 
 
 −2.616 2.722 −3.017 4.618 
(Call option)   (11.93) (30.49) (5.80) (21.45) 
Probability of negative 
equity 
  3.967 2.105 3.533 5.377 
(Put option)   (5.69) (13.13) (9.55) (10.04) 
Presale (Dummy) 1.058 1.118 1.013 1.097 1.090 1.020 
Interaction of presale 
and call option 
    −1.937 
(7.42) 
−2.029 
(8.86) 
Interaction of presale 
and put option 
    −3.103 
(7.54) 
−3.462 
(6.45) 
Age ≥ 40 −0.283 
(4.65) 
0.105 
(4.73) 
−0.280 
(4.54) 
0.111 
(4.96) 
−0.245 
(3.93) 
0.103 
(4.61) 
Female (dummy) −0.044 
(0.82) 
0.009 
(0.44) 
0.010 
(0.18) 
0.020 
(1.02) 
0.007 
(0.13) 
0.022 
(1.12) 
Married (dummy) −0.017 
(1.29) 
−0.057 
(2.85) 
−0.027 
(1.42) 
−0.064 
(3.15) 
−0.058 
(1.97) 
−0.067 
(3.28) 
Occupation: business 
and trade (dummy) 
−0.077 
(0.84) 
0.051 
(1.96) 
−0.095 
(1.03) 
0.050 
(2.33) 
−0.022 
(0.24) 
0.045 
(1.94) 
Occupation: social 
service (dummy) 
0.070 
(0.70) 
0.013 
(2.33) 
0.943 
(0.44) 
0.018 
(1.95) 
0.054 
(0.53) 
0.013 
(0.33) 
Ocupation: others 
(dummy) 
−0.141 
(1.78) 
0.060 
(2.15) 
−0.180 
(0.23) 
0.047 
(2.62) 
−0.106 
(1.32) 
0.045 
(1.61) 
Occupation: R&D 
(dummy) 
0.017 
(0.15) 
−0.033 
(2.84) 
0.040 
(0.34) 
−0.024 
(2.17) 
−0.136 
(1.15) 
−0.022 
2.06 
Education: secondary 
school (dummy) 
−0.102 
(0.78) 
−0.083 
(1.55) 
−0.110 
(0.83) 
−0.046 
(0.86) 
−0.056 
(0.42) 
0.044 
(0.82) 
Education: college 
(dummy) 
−0.149 
(2.63) 
0.119 
(5.37) 
−0.158 
(2.78) 
0.108 
(4.86) 
−0.127 
(2.23) 
0.106 
(4.79) 
Job position: manager 
(dummy) 
−0.021 
(0.24) 
0.045 
(2.71) 
−0.019 
(0.22) 
0.036 
(2.18) 
−0.025 
(0.29) 
0.036 
(2.36) 
Job position: technician 
(dummy) 
0.013 
(0.12) 
−0.063 
(1.98) 
0.031 
(0.29) 
−0.049 
(1.95) 
0.082 
(1.76) 
−0.051 
(1.45) 
Number of dependents 0.229 
(20.63) 
−0.568 
(50.02) 
0.224 
(20.09) 
−0.550 
(48.49) 
0.213 
(18.67) 
−0.549 
(48.40) 
Log monthly income −0.100 
(2.60) 
0.130 
(6.62) 
−0.103 
(1.63) 
0.123 
(6.07) 
−0.152 
(2.40) 
0.122 
(6.03) 
Multiple project 
(Dummy) 
−1.829 
(10.68) 
0.077 
(3.35) 
−1.748 
(10.08) 
0.119 
(5.14) 
−1.868 
(2.40) 
0.116 
(5.03) 
Size (In 10 mil. currency 
Adj.) 
−0.104 
(6.31) 
0.000 
(0.79) 
−0.099 
(5.96) 
0.000 
(0.31) 
−0.099 
(6.44) 
0.000 
(0.51) 
Number of employee −0.063 
(15.82) 
0.000 
(1.58) 
−0.060 
(15.25) 
0.000 
(1.43) 
−0.061 
(15.37) 
0.000 
(1.00) 
License longer than 
20 years (dummy) 
−0.458 
(3.86) 
0.152 
(6.89) 
−0.426 
(3.57) 
0.105 
(4.72) 
−0.502 
(4.15) 
0.103 
(4.64) 
New developer (dummy) 2.431 
(9.80) 
0.123 
(5.13) 
2.499 
(9.83) 
0.117 
(4.89) 
2.457 
(9.57) 
0.118 
(4.94) 
Developer type: joint −0.936 0.056 −0.987 0.130 −0.934 0.128 
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venture w/ foreign 
developer (dummy) 
(7.16) (1.14) (7.37) (2.68) (6.96) (2.63) 
Developer type: joint 
venture w/ HK, Macau, 
TW (dummy) 
0.834 
(8.59) 
−0.059 
(0.87) 
0.844 
(8.63) 
−0.049 
(0.72) 
0.800 
(8.20) 
−0.039 
(0.58) 
Developer type: private 
developer (dummy) 
0.196 
(1.14) 
0.158 
(2.68) 
0.295 
(1.72) 
0.157 
(2.66) 
0.299 
(1.78) 
0.150 
(2.55) 
Developer type 
limited co. (dummy) 
0.504 
(5.03) 
0.094 
(2.36) 
0.451 
(4.48) 
0.101 
2.56 
0.506 
(4.99) 
0.105 
(2.65) 
Central city location 
(dummy) 
−1.306 
(9.55) 
0.086 
(3.38) 
−1.224 
(8.93) 
0.084 
(3.30) 
−1.271 
(9.18) 
0.085 
(3.35) 
Ratio of certified 
professionals 
−4.501 
(9.55) 
0.256 
(5.38) 
−4.402 
(18.38) 
0.269 
(5.67) 
−4.470 
(18.51) 
0.271 
(5.71) 
Loan to value ratio 
 
0.068 
(1.70) 
−0.043 
(3.25) 
0.046 
(3.08) 
−0.073 
(4.11) 
−0.003 
(0.06) 
−0.074 
(4.12) 
Housing expenditure 
to income ratio 
0.578 
(9.95) 
−0.363 
(12.68) 
0.537 
(9.08) 
−0.352 
(12.43) 
0.360 
(5.89) 
−0.343 
(12.13) 
Log loan amount 0.129 
(0.99) 
−0.117 
(1.87) 
0.047 
(0.72) 
−0.190 
(1.36) 
−0.061 
(0.92) 
−0.191 
(1.53) 
Stock market 0.002 
(1.79) 
−0.005 
(39.45) 
0.002 
(0.50) 
−0.005 
(39.50) 
0.002 
(1.43) 
−0.005 
(39.36) 
Term structure slope −0.494 
(2.16) 
−1.549 
(48.74) 
−0.762 
(3.11) 
−1.512 
(47.30) 
−0.649 
(2.65) 
−1.511 
(47.28) 
Unemployment 0.059 
(7.69) 
0.081 
(48.20) 
0.046 
(5.44) 
0.077 
(46.21) 
0.053 
(6.27) 
0.076 
(46.01) 
Log likelihood 165,089  164,254  164,107  
SBC 165,545  164,747  164,638  
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Table 7. Maximum likelihood estimates for competing risks of Chinese adjustable rate mortgage 
prepayment and default  
 Model 4: Model 4: 
Spot market Forward market 
Default Prepay Default Prepay 
Fraction of contract value 
(call option) 
−0.264 (1.39) 3.846 (9.58) −2.333 (9.14) 2.536 (27.60) 
Probability of negative equity 
(put option) 
9.155 (2.33) 2.809 (2.03) 2.789 (0.87) 2.096 (0.55) 
Age ≥ 40 (dummy) −0.500 (2.01) 0.140 (2.41) −0.218 (1.97) 0.118 (1.67) 
Female (dummy) −0.073 (1.29) −0.012 (1.13) 0.023 (0.40) 0.024 (1.19) 
Married (dummy) −1.536 (4.06) −0.200 (2.42) −0.136 (1.17) −0.054 (1.59) 
Occupation: business and 
trade (dummy) 
−0.678 (1.79) 0.138 (1.02) −0.022 (0.23) 0.037 (1.14) 
Occupation: social service 
(dummy) 
0.922 (2.33) 0.082 (0.50) −0.008 (0.08) 0.002 (0.04) 
Occupation: others (dummy) −0.643 (1.94) 0.150 (1.34) −0.152 (1.97) 0.036 (1.37) 
Occupation: R&D (dummy) 0.064 (0.16) −0.118 (0.70) −0.081 (0.63) 0.012 (0.30) 
Education: secondary school 
(dummy) 
−0.848 (2.03) −0.131 (0.57) 0.006 (0.05) −0.039 (0.72) 
Education: college (dummy) −0.470 (3.94) 0.121 (3.15) 0.041 (0.92) −0.100 (1.74) 
Job position: manager 
(dummy) 
−0.001 (0.00) 0.027 (1.99) 0.055 (0.55) −0.046 (1.52) 
Job position: self-employment 
(dummy) 
0.983 (2.00) −0.160 (1.89) 1.028 (1.41) −0.065 (1.26) 
Job position: technician 
(dummy) 
0.351 (0.54) 0.058 (0.29) 0.093 (0.64) −0.075 (1.60) 
Number of dependents 0.791 (6.19) −0.734 (13.61) 0.218 (14.08) −0.528 (43.99) 
Log monthly income −0.194 (2.00) 0.228 (2.73) −0.105 (1.60) 0.116 (5.43) 
Multiple project (dummy) −0.144 (0.47) −0.061 (0.63) −2.540 (8.13) 0.123 (5.10) 
Size (in 10 mil. currency adj.) −0.024 (2.49) 0.004 (2.96) −0.216 (14.15) 0.000 (0.07) 
Number of employee −0.004 (0.58) 0.000 (0.08) −0.065 (11.30) 0.000 (2.40) 
License longer than 20 years 
(dummy) 
−0.078 (0.32) −0.007 (0.09) −0.244 (2.13) 0.099 (5.41) 
New developer (dummy) 0.158 (0.32) 0.033 (0.34) 3.600 (6.17) 0.116 (4.70) 
Developer type: joint venture 
w/ foreign developer (dummy) 
17.359 (0.00) 0.026 (0.13) −0.828 (6.01) 0.134 (2.61) 
Developer type: joint venture 
w/ HK, Macau, TW (dummy) 
23.196 (0.00) 0.412 (1.46) 0.817 (7.63) −0.068 (1.98) 
Developer type: private 
developer (dummy) 
17.854 (0.00) 0.025 (0.11) 0.308 (1.79) 0.153 (2.54) 
Developer type: limited 
co. (dummy) 
21.694 (0.00) 0.061 (0.35) 0.522 (4.49) 0.131 (2.93) 
Central city location (dummy) −0.101 (2.18) 0.074 (2.55) −2.693 (8.40) 0.111 (3.27) 
Ratio of certified professionals 0.003 (0.00) −0.016 (0.08) −4.410 (16.77) 0.269 (5.55) 
Loan to value ratio 0.947 (2.83) −0.125 (1.62) −0.045 (0.87) −0.072 (3.81) 
Housing expenditure to income 
ratio 
1.215 (8.59) −0.790 (7.15) −0.006 (0.10) −0.330 (13.65) 
Developer concentration index
a
 −0.319 (0.93) 0.246 (1.02) 0.401 (16.40) 0.296 (1.15) 
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Log loan amount 1.514 (5.25) −0.252 (3.07) −0.199 (2.95) −0.184 (8.79) 
Stock market 0.010 (0.17) −0.008 11.48 0.002 (5.88) −0.005 (36.64) 
Slope term structure 3.373 (0.00) −1.446 (9.94) −0.526 (2.23) −1.389 (44.59) 
Unemployment 2.012 (0.01) 9.707 (2.88) 6.065 (7.75) 8.289 (53.07) 
Log likelihood 10,533  165,492  
SBC 11,454  170,943  
 
t-ratios are in parentheses 
a 
Developer concentration index (DCI) is defined as follows, where s is defined as the ratio of 
number of developers involved over number of loans defaulted (prepaid) 
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Table 8. Risk premium of forward mortgage over spot mortgage 
 1-year seasoned 2-year seasoned 5-year seasoned 
Risk Premium 1.85% 2.49% 2.31% 
T-Ratio (5.93) (45.28) (8.57) 
 
t-ratios are in parentheses. The simulated market values are computed based on model 4 in Table 
7, together with joint processes of stock market and housing prices 
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Figure 1. Residential mortgage market in China 
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Figure 2. International comparison of mortgage to consumer loan ratio (2003) 
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Figure 3. Market microstructure of forward and spot housing market in China  
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Figure 4. Interest rate and mortgage rates in China 
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Figure 5. Stock index return in Shanghai, China 
 
